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Innovation is not a new phenomenon. Arguably, it is as old as mankind itself. However, in 
spite of its obvious importance, innovation has not always got the scholarly attention it 
deserves. This is now rapidly changing, however. As shown in the paper, research on the role 
of innovation economic and social change has proliferated in recent years, particularly within 
the social sciences, and often with a bent towards cross-disciplinarity. It is argued that this 
reflects the fact that no single discipline deals with all aspects of innovation, and that in order 
to get a comprehensive overview of the role played by innovation in social and economic 
change, a cross-disciplinary perspective is a must. The purpose of the paper is to provide the 
reader with a guide to this rapidly expanding literature. In doing so it draws on larger 
collective effort financed by the European Commission (the TEARI project, see 
http://tikpc51.uio.no/teari/teari.htm ), one of the outputs of which will emerge as Oxford 
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Innovation is not a new phenomenon. Arguably, it is as old as mankind itself. There seems to 
be something inherently “human” about the tendency to think about new and better ways of 
doing things and try them out in practice. Without it the world in which we live would have 
looked very, very different. Try for a moment to think of a world without airplanes, 
automobiles, telecommunications and refrigerators, just to mention a few important 
innovations from the not too distant past. Or – in an even longer perspective – where would 
we be without fundamental innovations such as agriculture, the wheel, the alphabet, printing 
etc.?     
In spite of its obvious importance, innovation has not always got the scholarly 
attention it deserves.  For instance, students of long-run economic change used to focus on 
other factors, such as capital accumulation or the working of markets, rather than innovation. 
This is now rapidly changing, however. Research on the role of innovation economic and 
social change has proliferated in recent years, particularly within the social sciences, and with 
a bent towards cross-disciplinarity. In fact, as illustrated in Figure 1, in recent years the 
number of social-science publications focusing on innovation has increased much faster than 
total number of such publications. As a result our knowledge about innovation processes, their 
determinants and social and economic impact is greatly enhanced. The purpose of this paper 
is to provide the reader with a guide to this rapidly expanding literature  
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When innovation-studies started to emerge as a separate field of research in the 1960s, 
it did so mostly outside the existing disciplines and the most prestigious universities. An 
important event in this process was the formation in 1965 of the Science Policy Research Unit 
(SPRU) at the University of Sussex (see Box 1). The name of the centre illustrates the 
tendency for innovation studies to develop under other (at the time more acceptable?) terms 
such as, for instance, “science studies” or “science policy studies”.  But as we shall see in the 
following, one of the main lessons from the research that came to be carried out is that science 
is only one among several ingredients in successful innovation. As a consequence of these 
findings not only the focus of research in this area but also the notions used to characterize it 
changed. During the last decade(s) a number of new research centres and departments have 
been founded focusing on the role of innovation in economic and social change. Many of 
these have a cross-disciplinary orientation, illustrating the need for innovation to be studied 
from different perspectives. Several journals and professional associations have also been 
founded. 
The leaning towards cross-disciplinarity that characterizes much scholarly work in this 
area reflects the fact that no single discipline deals with all aspects of innovation. Hence, to 
get a comprehensive overview, it is necessary to combine insights from several disciplines. 
Economics, for instance, has traditionally primarily dealt with the allocation of resources to 
innovation (in competition with other ends) and its economic effects, while the innovation 
process itself has been more or less treated as a “black box”. What happens within this “box” 
has been left to scholars from other disciplines. A lot of what happens obviously has to do 
with learning, a central topic in cognitive science.  Such learning occurs in organized settings, 
e.g., groups, teams, firm and networks, the working of which is studied within disciplines 
such as sociology, organizational science, management and business studies. The way 
innovation is organized also undergoes important changes through time, as underscored by a   3 
lot of work within economic history.  There is also, as historians of technology have pointed 
out, a specific technological dimension to this; the way innovation is organized, as well as its 
economic and social effects, depends critically on the specific nature of the technology in 
question.    
 The next section addresses some conceptual issues related to innovation and its role in 
social and economic life, followed, in section three, by a closer focus on the process through 
which innovations occur and the actors that take part: individuals, firms, organizations and 
networks. As we will discuss in more detail below, innovation is by its very nature a systemic 
phenomenon, since it results from continuing interaction between different actors and 
organizations. The fourth section outlines this “systems perspective” on innovation studies 
and discusses the role of institutions, organizations and actors in this process at the national 
and regional level.  Section five explores the diversity in how such systems work over time 
and across different sectors or industries. Finally, the fifth section examines the broader social 
and economic consequences of innovation and the associated policy issues, followed by a 
discussion of the state of the art in this area and the future research agenda.  
 
What is innovation? 
   
An important distinction is normally made between invention and innovation.
3 Invention is 
the first occurrence of an idea for a new product or process. Innovation is the first 
commercialization of the idea. Sometimes invention and innovation are closely linked, to the 
extent that it is hard to distinguish one from another (biotechnology for instance). In many 
cases, however, there is a considerable time lag between the two. In fact a lag of several 
decades or more is not uncommon (Rogers 1995). Such lags reflect the different requirements 
for working out ideas and carrying them out in practice. First of all, while inventions may be 
carried out anywhere such as, for instance, in universities, innovations occur mostly in firms 
in the commercial sphere. To be able to turn an invention into an innovation a firm normally 
needs to combine several different types of knowledge, capabilities, skills and resources. For 
instance the firm may require production knowledge, skills and facilities, market knowledge, 
a well-functioning distribution system, sufficient financial resources and so on.  It follows that 
the role of the innovator,
4 e.g., the person or organizational unit responsible for combining the 
factors necessary (what the innovation-theorist Joseph Schumpeter (see Box 2) called the 
“entrepreneur”), may be quite different from that of the inventor. 
 
(BOX 2 APPR. HERE) 
 
Long lags between invention and innovation may also have to do with the fact that in 
many cases, some or all of the conditions for commercialization may be lacking. There may 
not be a sufficient need (yet!) or it may be impossible to produce and/or market because some 
                                                 
3 A consistent use of the terms invention and innovation might be to reserve these for the first time occurrence of 
the idea/concept and commercialization, respectively. In practice it may not always be so simple. For instance 
people may very well conceive the same idea independently of each other. Historically there are many examples 
of this; writing for instance was clearly invented several times (and in different cultural settings) throughout 
history (Diamond 1998). Arguably, this phenomenon may have been reduced in importance over time, as 
communication across the globe has progressed. 
4  In the sociological literature on diffusion (i.e. spread of innovations) it is common to characterize any adopter 
of a new technology, product or service an innovator. This then leads to a distinction between different types of 
innovators, depending on how quick they are in adopting the innovation, and a discussion of which factors might 
possibly explain such differences (Rogers 1995). While this use of the terminology may be a useful one in the 
chosen context, it clearly differs from the one adopted elsewhere, and to use both definitions simultaneously may 
easily lead to confusion. It might therefore be preferable to use terms such “imitator” or “adopter” for such cases.   4 
vital inputs or complementary factors are not (yet!) available.  For instance, although 
Leonardo da Vinci is reported have had some quite advanced ideas for an airplane, these were 
impossible to carry out in practice due to lack of adequate materials, production skills and – 
above all – a power source. In fact the realization of these ideas had to wait for the invention 
and subsequent commercialization (and improvement) of the internal combustion engine.
5 
Hence, as this example shows, many inventions require complementary inventions and 
innovations to succeed at the innovation stage.  
Another complicating factor is that invention and innovation is a continuous process.  
For instance, the car as we know it today is radically improved compared to its first 
commercialization, through the incorporation of a very large number of different 
inventions/innovations. In fact, the first versions of virtually all significant innovations, from 
the steam engine to the airplane, were crude, unreliable versions of the devices that eventually 
diffused widely. Kline and Rosenberg (1986), in an influential paper, point out: 
“it is a serious mistake to treat an innovation as if it were a well-defined, homogenous 
thing that could be identified as entering the economy at a precise date – or becoming 
available at a precise point in time. (…) The fact is that most important innovations go 
through drastic changes in their lifetimes – changes that may, and often do, totally 
transform their economic significance. The subsequent improvements in an invention 
after its first introduction may be vastly more important, economically, than the initial 
availability of the invention in its original form” (Kline and Rosenberg 1986, p.283)  
Thus, what we think of as a single innovation is often the result of a lengthy process involving 
many interrelated innovations. This is one of the reasons why many students of technology 
and innovation find it natural to apply a systems perspective rather than to focus exclusively 
on individual inventions/innovations.   
Innovations may be classified according to “type”.  Schumpeter (see Box 2) 
distinguished between five different types; new products, new methods of production, new 
sources of supply, exploitation of new markets and new ways to organize business. However, 
in economics most of the focus has been on the two first of these. Schmookler (1966), for 
instance, in his classic work on “Invention and Economic Growth”, argued that the distinction 
between “product technology” and “production technology” was “critical” for our 
understanding of this phenomenon (ibid, p. 166). He defined the former type as knowledge 
about how to create or improve products, and the latter as knowledge about how to produce 
them. Similarly, the terms “product innovation” and “process innovation” have been used to 
characterize the occurrence of new or improved goods and services, and improvements in the 
ways to produce these, respectively.
6 The argument for focusing particularly on the distinction 
between product and process innovation often rests on the assumption that the economic and 
social impact may differ. For instance, while the introduction of new products is commonly 
assumed to have a clear positive effect on growth of income and employment, it has been 
argued that process innovation, due to its cost-cutting nature, may have more a more 
ambiguous effect (Edquist et al. 2001, Pianta in this volume). However, while clearly 
distinguishable at the level of the individual firm or industry, such differences tend to become 
                                                 
5 Similarly for automobiles: while the idea of a power driven vehicle had been around for a long time, and 
several early attempts to commercialize cars driven by steam, electricity and other sources had been made, it was 
the incorporation of an internal combustion engine driven by low-cost, easily available petrol that made the 
product a real hit in the market (Mowery and Rosenberg 1998). 
6 A somewhat similar distinction has been suggested by Henderson and Clark (1990). They distinguish between 
the components (or modules) of a product or service and the way these components are combined, e.g. the 
product “design” or “architecture”. A change only in the former is dubbed  “modular innovation”, change  only 
in the latter “architectural innovation”.  They argue that these two types of innovation refer to different types of 
knowledge (and, hence, challenges for the firm).      5 
more blurred at the level of the overall economy, because the product of one firm (or industry) 
may end up as being used to produce goods or services in another.
7 
The focus on product- and process innovations, while useful for the analysis of some 
issues, should not lead us ignore other important aspects of innovation. For instance, many of 
the innovations that, during the first half of the twentieth century, made it possible to for the 
United States to “forge ahead” of other capitalist economies, were of the organizational kind, 
involving entirely new ways to organize production and distribution (see Bruland and 
Mowery in this volume, Lam provides an overview of organizational innovation). Edquist et 
al.(2001) have suggested dividing the category of process innovation into “technological 
process innovations” and “organizational process innovations”, the former related to new 
types of machinery, and the latter to new ways to organize work. However, organizational 
innovations are not limited to new ways to organize the process of production within a given 
firm. Organizational innovation, in the sense used by Schumpeter,
8 also included 
arrangements across firms such as reorganization of entire industries. Moreover, as 
exemplified by the case of the USA in the first half of the previous century, many of the most 
important organizational innovations there took place in distribution, with great consequences 
for a whole range of industries (Chandler 1990). 
Another approach, also based on Schumpeter’s work, has been to classify innovations 
according to how radical they are compared to the existing setup (Freeman and Soete 1997). 
From this perspective continuous improvements of the type referred to above are often 
characterized as “incremental” or “marginal” innovations,
9 as opposed to “radical” 
innovations (such as the introduction of a totally new type of machinery) or “technological 
revolutions” (consisting of a cluster of innovations that together may have a very far-reaching 
impact). Schumpeter focused in particular on the latter two categories, which he believed to 
be greater importance. It is a widely held view, however, that the cumulative impact of 
incremental innovations is just as great (if not greater), and that to ignore these would lead to 
a biased view on long run economic and social change (Lundvall et al. 1992). Arguably, the 
bulk of economic benefits come from incremental innovations and improvements. 
There is also the question of how to take different contexts into account. If A for the 
first time introduces a particular innovation in one context while B later does exactly the same 
it in another, would we characterize both as innovators? This is a matter of convention. A 
widely used practice, based on Schumpeter’s work, is to reserve the term innovator for A and 
characterize B as an imitator. However, one might argue that, following Schumpeter’s own 
definition, it would be equally consistent to call B and innovator as well, since B is 
introducing the innovation for the first time in a new context. This is, for instance, the position 
taken by Hobday (2000) in a discussion of innovation in the so-called “newly industrializing 
countries” in Asia. One might object, though, that there is a qualitative difference between (a) 
commercializing something for the first time and (b) copying it and introducing it in a 
different context. The latter arguably includes a larger dose of imitative behavior, or what is 
sometimes called “technology transfer”, and may be best classified as such (imitation). This 
does not exclude the possibility that imitation may lead to new innovation(s). In fact, as 
pointed out by Kline and Rosenberg (1986, see Box 3), many economically significant 
innovations occur while a product or process is diffusing (see also Hall in this volume). 
                                                 
7 In fact, many economists go so far as to argue that the savings in costs, following a process innovation in a 
single firm or industry, by necessity will generate additional income and demand in the economy at large, which 
will “compensate” for any initial negative effects of a process innovation on overall employment. For a rebuttal, 
see Edquist 2001 and Pianta in this volume. 
8 Schumpeter 1934, p. 66. 
9 In the sociological literature on innovation the term “reinvention” is often used to characterize improvements 
that occur to a product or service while it is spreading in a population of adopters (Rogers 1995).   6 
Introducing something in a new context often implies considerable adaptation (and, hence, 
marginal innovation) and, as history has shown, organizational changes (or innovations) that 
may significantly increase productivity and competitiveness (see Godinho and Fagerberg in 
this volume).
10    
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Innovation in the making  
 
Leaving definitions aside, the fundamental question for innovation research is of course to 
explain how innovations occur. One of the reasons why innovation was ignored in 
mainstream social science for so long was that this was seen as impossible to do.  The best 
one could do, it was commonly assumed, was to look at it as a random phenomenon (or 
“manna from heaven” as some scholars used to phrase it). Schumpeter, in his early works, 
was one of the first to object to this practice. His own account of these processes emphasized 
three main aspects. The first was the fundamental uncertainty inherent in all innovation 
projects. The second was the need to move quickly before somebody else did (and reaped the 
potential economic reward). In practice, Schumpeter argued, these two aspects meant that the 
standard behavioural rules economists used to assume, e.g., surveying all information, 
assessing it and finding the “optimal” choice, wouldn’t work. Other, quicker ways had to be 
found.  This did in his view involve leadership and vision, two qualities he associated with 
entrepreneurship. The third was the prevalence of “resistance to new ways” – or inertia – at all 
levels of society, which threatened to destroy all novel initiatives, and forced entrepreneurs to 
fight hard to succeed in their innovation projects. Or as he put it: “In the breast of one who 
wishes to do something new, the forces of habit raise up and bear witness against the 
embryonic project” (Schumpeter 1934, p. 86). Such inertia, in Schumpeter’s view, was to 
some extent endogenous, since it reflected the embedded character of existing knowledge and 
habit, which, though “energy-saving”, tended to bias decision-making against new ways of 
doing things.  
Hence, in Schumpeter’s account innovation is the outcome of continuous struggle in 
historical time between individual entrepreneurs, advocating novel solutions to particular 
problems, and social inertia, with the latter is seen as (partly) endogenous. However, in 
reality, most innovations involve teamwork and take place within larger organizations (Lam 
in this volume). Thus, Schumpeter, especially in his early works (what is sometimes called 
“Schumpeter Mark I”), failed to take the organizational dimension properly into account. In 
later work he acknowledged this weakness, and emphasized the importance of “co-operative” 
entrepreneurship in big firms (so-called “Schumpeter Mark II”), without analysing the 
phenomenon in detail (although he strongly advised others to).
11  
Systematic theoretical and empirical work on innovation-projects in firms (and the 
management of such projects) was slow to evolve but during the last decades a quite 
substantial literature has emerged (see chapters by Pavitt and Lam in this volume). In general, 
research in this area agrees with Schumpeter’s emphasis on uncertainty (Nelson and Winter 
1982, Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995 and Van de Ven et al. 1999). In particular for potentially 
                                                 
10 Kim and Nelson (2000) suggest the term “active imitation” for producers, who – by imitating already existing 
products – modify and improve these. 
11 For instance, in one his last papers, he pointed out: “To let the murder out and start my final thesis, what is 
really required is a large collection of industrial and locational monographs all drawn up according to the same 
plan and giving proper attention on the one hand to the incessant historical change in production and 
consumption functions and on the other hand to the quality and behaviour of leading personell” (Schumpeter 
1949/1989, p. 328)   7 
rewarding innovations, it is argued, one may simply not know what the most relevant sources 
or the best options to pursue are (not to say how great the chance is to succeed).
 12 It has also 
been emphasized that innovative firms need to consider the potential problems that “path 
dependency” may create (Arthur 1994). For instance, if a firm selects a specific innovation 
path very early, it may (if it is lucky) enjoy “first mover” advantages. But it also risks being 
“locked in” to this specific path through various self-reinforcing effects. If in the end it turns 
out that there actually existed a superior path, which some other firm equipped with more 
patience (or luck) happened to find, the early mover may be in big trouble because then, it is 
argued, it may simply be too costly or too late to switch path.  It has been suggested, 
therefore,  that in the early phase of an innovation project, before sufficient knowledge of the 
alternatives is generated, the best strategy may simply be to avoid being “stuck” to a 
particular path, and remain open to different (and competing) ideas/solutions. At the level of 
the firm this requires, it has been argued, a “pluralistic leadership” that allows for a variety of 
competing perspectives (Van de Ven et al. 1999), in contrast to the homogenous, unitary 
leader style that, in the management literature, is sometimes considered as the most 
advantageous.
13  
 Hence, “openness” to new ideas, solutions, etc. is considered essential for innovation 
projects, especially in its early phases. The principle reason for this has to with a fundamental 
characteristic of innovation: that every new innovation consists of a new combination of 
existing ideas, capabilities, skills, resources etc. It follows logically from this that the greater 
the variety in these factors within a given system, the greater the scope for new combinations 
of these factors, that is, new innovations, and the more complex (and sophisticated) these 
innovations will be. This evolutionary logic has, for instance been, used to explain why, in 
ancient times, the inhabitants of the large Eurasian landmass came to be more innovative, and 
technologically sophisticated, than small, isolated populations elsewhere on the globe 
(Diamond 1998). Applied mechanically on a population of firms this logic might perhaps be 
taken to imply that large firms should be expected to be more innovative than small firms?
14  
However, modern firms are not closed systems comparable to isolated populations of ancient 
times. Firms have learnt, by necessity, to closely monitor each other’s steps, and search 
widely for new ideas, inputs and sources of inspiration. The more firms on average are able to 
learn from interacting with external sources, the greater the pressure on other firms to follow 
suit. This greatly enhances the innovativeness of both individual firms and the economic 
systems to which they belong (regions or countries, for instance). Arguably, this is of 
particular importance for smaller firms, which have to compensate for small internal resources 
by being good at interacting with the outside world. However, the growing complexity of the 
knowledge bases necessary for innovation means that even large firms increasingly depend on 
external sources in their innovative activity (Granstrand, Patel and Pavitt, 1997, and Pavitt, 
Powell and Grodal, Narula and Zanfei, all in this volume). 
                                                 
12 Even in cases where the project ultimately is successful in aims, entrepreneurs face the challenge of 
convincing the leadership of the firm to launch it commercially (which may be much more costly than 
developing it). This may for instance fail if the leadership of the firm has doubts about its commercial viability. 
It may be very difficult for management to foresee the economic potential of a project, even if it is “technically” 
successful. Remember, for instance, IBM- director Thomas Watson’s dictum in 1948 that “there is a world 
market for about five computers” (Tidd et al. 1997, p.60)!   
13 “A unified homogenous leadership structure is effective for routine trial-and-error learning by making 
convergent, incremental improvements in relatively stable and unambiguous situations. However, this kind of 
learning is a conservative process that maintains and converges organizational routines and relationships towards 
the existing strategic vision (…) although such learning is viewed as wisdom in stable environments, it produces 
inflexibility and competence traps in changing worlds.” (Van de Ven et al. 1999, p. 117)  
14 It would also imply that large countries should be expected to be more innovative than smaller ones, consistent 
with, for instance, the prediction of so-called “new growth” theory (Romer 1990). See Verspagen in this volume.   8 
Thus, cultivating the capacity for absorbing (outside) knowledge, so-called “absorptive 
capacity” (Cohen and Levinthal 1990), is a must for innovative firms, large or small.  It is, 
however, something that firms often find very challenging; the “not invented here” syndrome 
is a well known feature in firms of all sizes. These problems arguably reflect the cumulative 
and embedded character of firm-specific knowledge. In most cases firms develop their 
knowledge of how to do things incrementally. Such knowledge, then, consists of “routines” 
that are reproduced through practice (“organizational memory”, Nelson and Winter 1982). 
Over time the organizational structure of the firm and its knowledge typically co-evolve into a 
set-up that is beneficial for the day-to-day operations of the firm. It has been argued, however, 
that such a set-up, while facilitating the daily internal communication/interaction of the firm, 
may in fact constrain the firm’s capacity for absorbing new knowledge created elsewhere, 
especially if the new external knowledge significantly challenges the existing set 
up/knowledge of the firm (so-called “competence destroying technical change”, Tushman and 
Anderson 1986).  In fact, such problems may occur even for innovations that are created 
internally. Xerox, for instance, developed both the PC and the mouse, but failed to 
commercially exploit these innovations, primarily because they did not seem to be of much 
value in the firm’s existing photo-copier business (Rogers 1995).  
Thus organizing for innovation is a delicate task. Research in this area has among other 
things pointed to the need for innovative firms to allow groups of people within the 
organization sufficient freedom in experimenting with new solutions (Van de Ven 1999), and 
establishing patterns of interaction within the firm that allows the firm to mobilize its entire 
knowledge base when confronting new challenges (Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995, Lam in this 
volume). Such organizing does not stop at the gate of the firm, however, but extends to 
relations with external partners. Ties to partners with whom communication is frequent are 
often called “strong ties”, while those that are more occasional are denoted “weak ties” 
(Granovetter 1973). Partners   linked together with strong ties, either directly, or indirectly via 
a common partner, may self-organize into (relatively stable) networks (see Powell and Grodal 
in this volume). Such networks may be very useful for managing and maintaining openness. 
But just as firms can display symptoms of path-dependency, the same can happen to 
established networks, as the participants converge to a common perception of reality (so-
called “group-think”).  Innovative firms therefore often find it useful to also cultivate so-
called “weak ties” in order to maintain a capacity for changing its orientation (should it prove 
necessary). 
    
The systemic nature of innovation   
 
As is evident from the preceding discussion, a central finding in the literature is that, in most 
cases, innovation activities in firms depend heavily on external sources. One recent study 
sums it up well:  “Popular folklore notwithstanding, the innovation journey is a collective 
achievement that requires key roles from numerous entrepreneurs in both the public and 
private sectors” (Van de Ven et al. 1999, p.149). In that particular study the term “social 
system for innovation development” was used to characterize this “collective achievement”. 
However, this is just one among several examples from the last decades of how system-
concepts are applied to the analysis of the relationship between innovation activities in firms 
and the wider framework in which these activities are embedded (see Edquist in this volume). 
One main approach has been to delineate systems on the basis of technological, 
industrial or sectoral characteristics (Freeman et al. 1982, Hughes 1983, Carlsson and 
Stankiewicz 1991, Malerba in this volume) but, to a varying degree, include other relevant 
factors such as, for instance, institutions (laws, regulations, rules, habits, etc.), the political 
process, the public research infrastructure (universities, research institutes, support from   9 
public sources etc,), financial institutions, skills (labour force). To explore the technological 
dynamics, its various phases, and how this influences and is influenced by the wider social, 
institutional and economic framework has been the main focus of this type of analysis. 
Another important approach in the innovation-systems literature has focused at the spatial 
level, and used national or regional borders to distinguish between different systems. For 
example, Lundvall (1992) and Nelson et al (1993) have both used the term “national system 
of innovation” to characterize the systemic interdependencies within a given country (see 
Edquist in this volume), while Braczyk et al. (1997) similarly have coined the notion 
“regional innovation systems” (see Asheim and Gertler in this volume). Since the spatial 
systems are delineated on the basis of political and administrative borders, such factors 
naturally tend to play an important role in analyses based on this approach, which have 
proven to be influential among policy makers in this area, especially in Europe (see Lundvall 
in this volume).  
What are the implications of applying a system-perspective to the study of innovation? 
Systems are – as networks – a set of activities (or actors) that are interlinked, and this leads 
naturally to a focus on the working of the linkages of the system.
15 Is the potential for 
communication and interaction through existing linkages sufficiently exploited? Are there 
potential linkages within the system that profitably might be established? Such questions 
apply of course for networks as well as systems. However, in the normal usage of the term, a 
system will typically have more “structure” than a network, and be of a more enduring 
character. The structure of a system will facilitate certain patterns of interaction and outcomes 
(and constrain others), and in this sense there is a parallel to the role of “inertia” in firms.  A 
dynamic system also has feedbacks, which may serve to reinforce – or weaken - the existing 
structure/functioning of the system, leading to “lock in “(a stable configuration), or a change 
in orientation or – eventually - the dissolution of the system. Hence, systems may – just as 
firms – be locked into a specific path of development that supports certain types of activities 
and constrains others. This may be seen as an advantage, as it gears the participating firms 
and other actors in the system in a direction that is deemed to be beneficial. But it may also be 
a disadvantage, if the configuration of the system leads firms towards ignoring potentially 
fruitful avenues of exploration. The character of such processes will be affected by the extent 
to which the system exchanges impulses with its environment. The more open a system is for 
impulses from outside, the less the chance is for being “locked out” from promising new paths 
of development that emerge outside the system.  It is, therefore, important for “system 
managers” - such as policy makers - to keep an eye on the openness of the system, to avoid 
that innovation activities become unduly constrained by self-reinforcing path-dependency.  
Another important feature of systems that has come into focus is the strong 
complementarities that commonly exist between the components of a system. If, in a dynamic 
system, one critical, complementary component is lacking, fails to progress or develop, this 
may block or slow down the growth of the entire system. This is, as pointed out earlier, one of 
the main reasons why there often is a very considerable time lag between invention and 
innovation.  Economic historians have commonly used concepts such as “reverse salients” 
and “bottlenecks” to characterize such phenomena (Hughes 1983, Rosenberg 1982). 
However, such constraints need not be of a purely technical character (such as, for instance, 
the failure to invent a decent battery, which has severely constrained the diffusion of electric 
cars for more than century), but may also have to do with lack of proper infrastructure, 
finance, skills etc. For instance, some of the most important innovations of this century, such 
as electricity and automobiles (Mowery and Rosenberg 1998, Bruland and Mowery in this 
volume), were dependent on very extensive infra-structural investments (wiring and 
                                                 
15 This is essentially what was suggested by Porter (1990).   10 
roads/distribution-system for fuel, respectively).  Moreover, to fulfil the potential of the new 
innovation, such investments often need to be accompanied by radical changes in the 
organisation of production and distribution (and, more generally, attitudes, see Perez 1983, 
1985 and Freeman and Louca 2001). There are important lessons from this for firms and 
policy-makers. Firms may need to take into account the wider social and economic 
implications of an innovation project. The more radical an innovation is, the greater the 
possibility is that it may require extensive infra-structural investments and/or organisational 
and social change to succeed. If so, the firm needs to think through how it may join up with 
other agents of change in the private or public sector. Policy makers, for their part, need to 
consider what different levels of government can do to prevent “bottlenecks” to occur at the 
system level in areas such as skills, the research infrastructure and the broader economic 
infrastructure.  
 
How innovation differs   
 
One of the striking facts about innovation is its variability over time and space. It seems, as 
Schumpeter (see Box 2) used to point out, to “cluster”, not only in certain sectors but also in 
certain areas and time periods. Over time the centres of innovation have shifted from one 
sector, region and country to another. For instance, for a long period the worldwide centre of 
innovation was in the UK, and the productivity and income of its population increased relative 
to its neighbouring countries, so that by the mid nineteenth century it was fifty percent higher 
than elsewhere.  Around the turn of the century the centre of innovation, at least in modern 
chemical and electrical technologies of the day, shifted to Germany. For a long time now the 
worldwide centre of innovation has been in the USA, which during most of the last century 
has enjoyed the highest productivity and living-standards in the world. As explained by 
Bruland and Mowery in this volume the rise of the US to world technological leadership was 
associated with the growth of new industries, based on exploitation of economies of scale and 
scope (Chandler 1962, 1990) and mass production and distribution 
How is this dynamics to be explained? Schumpeter, extending an earlier line of 
argument dating back to Karl Marx,
16 held technological competition (competition through 
innovation) to be the driving force of economic development. If one firm in a given industry 
or sector successfully introduces an important innovation, the argument goes, it will be amply 
rewarded by a higher rate of profit. This functions as a signal to other firms  - the imitators - 
that “swarm” the industry or sector with the hope of sharing the benefits (with the result that 
the initial innovator’s first mover advantages becomes quickly eroded). This “swarming” of 
imitators implies that the growth of the sector or industry in which the innovation occurs for a 
while will be quite high. Sooner or later, however, the effects on growth (created by an 
innovation) will be depleted and growth slow down.    
To this essentially Marxian story Schumpeter added an important modification.  
Imitators, it was argued, are much more likely to succeed in their aims if they improve on the 
original innovation, e.g., become innovators themselves. This is all the more natural, 
Schumpeter argued, because one (important) innovation tends to facilitate (induce) other 
innovations in the same or related fields.  In this way, innovation-diffusion becomes a creative 
process, in which one important innovation sets the stage for a whole series of subsequent 
innovations, and not the passive, adaptive process often assumed in diffusion research (see 
Hall in this volume). The systemic interdependencies between the initial and induced 
innovations also imply that innovations (and growth) “tend to concentrate in certain sectors 
and their surroundings” or “clusters” (Schumpeter 1939, pp. 100-101). Schumpeter, as is well 
                                                 
16 See Fagerberg 2002, 2003 for a discussion of this ”Marx-Schumpeter” model.   11 
known, looked at this dynamics as possible explanatory factor behind business cycles of 
various lengths (Freeman and Louca 2001).  
  This simple scheme has been remarkably successful in inspiring applications in 
different areas. For instance, there is a large amount of research that has adapted the Marx-
Schumpeter model of technological competition to the study of industrial growth, 
international trade and competitiveness,
 17 although sometimes, it must be said, without 
acknowledging the source for these ideas. An early and very influential contribution was the 
so-called  “product-life-cycle theory” suggested by Vernon (1966), in which industrial growth 
following an important product innovation was seen as composed by stages, characterized by 
changing conditions of composition (and location of production).
18 Basically what was 
assumed was that the ability to do product innovation mattered most at the early stage, in 
which there were many different and competing versions of the product on the market. 
However, with time the product was assumed to standardize, and this was assumed to be 
accompanied by a greater emphasis on process innovation, scale economics and cost-
competition. It was argued that these changes in competitive conditions might initiate transfer 
of the technology from the innovator country (high income) to countries with large markets 
and/or low costs. Such transfers might also be associated with international capital-flows in 
the form of so-called foreign direct investments (FDIs), and the theory has therefore also 
become known as a framework for explaining such flows (see Narula and Zanfei in this 
volume). 
 
BOX 4. APPR. HERE 
BOX 5. APPR. HERE 
 
 
The “product-life-cycle theory”, attractive as it was in its simplicity, was not always 
corroborated by subsequent research. While it got some of the general conjectures (borrowed 
from Schumpeter) right, the rigorous scheme it had added, with well-defined stages, 
standardization and changing competitive requirements, was shown to fit only a minority of 
industries (Walker 1979, Cohen 1995). Although good data are hard to come by, what 
emerges from empirical research is a much more complex picture,
19 with considerable 
differences across industrial sectors in the way this dynamics is shaped. As exemplified by the 
taxonomy suggested by Pavitt (see Box 4), exploration of such differences (“industrial 
dynamics”) has evolved into one of the main areas of research within innovation studies (see 
the chapters by Malerba, VonTunzelmann/Acha and Miles in this volume). Inspired, to a large 
extent, by the seminal work by Nelson and Winter (see Box 5), research in this area has 
explored how industries and sectors differ in terms their internal dynamics (or “technological 
regimes”, see Malerba and Orsenigo 1997), focusing, in particular, on the differences across 
sectors in knowledge bases, actors, networks and institutions (so called “sectoral systems”, 
see Malerba in this volume).  An important result from this research is that, since the factors 
that influence innovation differ across industries, policy makers have to take such differences 
into account when designing policies. The same policy (and policy instruments) won’t work 
equally well everywhere 
  
                                                 
17  See Fagerberg (1996), Wakelin (1997) and Cantwell in this volume for overviews of some of this literature. 
18 For a more recent analysis in this spirit, with a lot of empirical case-studies, see Utterback (1994). 
19 Available econometric evidence suggests that innovation, measured in various ways (see Smith in this 
volume), matters in many industries, not only those which could be classified as being in the early stage of the 
product-cycle (Soete 1987, Fagerberg 2002, ch. 14).   12 
Innovation and economic performance  
 
The Marx-Schumpeter model was not, however, primarily intended as a model of industrial 
dynamics (and differences in such across industries, sectors and time).  Its primary purpose 
was to explain long run economic change, what Schumpeter called “development”. The core 
of the argument was (1) that technological competition is the major form of competition under 
capitalism (and firms not responding to these demands would fail), and (2) that innovations, 
e.g., “new combinations” of existing knowledge and resources, open up possibilities for new 
business opportunities, and innovations, in the future, and in this way set the stage for 
continuing change. This perspective, while convincing, had little influence on the economics 
discipline at the time of its publication, may be because it did not led itself easily to formal, 
mathematical modelling of the type that had become increasingly popular in that field. More 
recently, however, economists (Romer 1990), drawing on new tools for mathematical 
modelling, have attempted to introduce some of the above ideas in formal growth models (so-
called “new growth theory” or “endogenous growth theory”).
20 
In applying this perspective, Schumpeter (1939) was, as noted, particularly concerned 
with the tendency of innovation to “cluster” in certain contexts, and the resulting structural 
changes in production, organization, demand etc. Although these ideas were not well received 
by the economic community at the time, the big slump in economic activity world-wide 
during the 1970s lead a to renewed attention, and several contributions emerged, viewing long 
run economic and social change from this perspective. For instance, both Mensch (1979) and 
Perez (1983, 1985) argued that major technological changes, such as, for instance, the ICT 
revolution today, or electricity a century ago, require extensive organizational and 
institutional change to run its course. Such change, however, is difficult because of the 
continuing influence of existing organizational and institutional patterns. They saw this inertia 
as a major growth-impeding factor in periods of rapid technological change, possibly 
explaining some of the variation of growth over time (e.g., booms and slumps) in capitalist 
economies. While the latter proposition remains controversial (Freeman and Louca 2001), the 
the relationship between technological, organisational and institutional change continues to be 
an important research issue (Freeman and Louca 2001), with important implications both for 
the analysis of the diffusion of new technologies (see Hall in this volume) and the policy 
discourse (see Lundvall and Borras in this volume). 
   Although neither Marx nor Schumpeter applied their dynamic perspective to the 
analysis of cross-national differences in growth performance,  from the early 1960s onwards 
several contributions have emerged that explore the potential of this perspective for 
explaining differences in cross-country growth. In what came to be a very influential 
contribution, Posner (1961) explained the difference in economic growth between two 
countries, at different levels of economic and technological development, as resulting from 
two sources; innovation, which enhanced the difference, and imitation, which tended to 
reduce it. This set the stage for a long series of contributions, often labelled “technology gap” 
or “north-south” models (or approaches), focusing on explaining such differences in 
economic growth across countries at different levels of development (see Fagerberg 1994, 
1996 for details). As for the lessons, one of the theoretical contributors in this area summed it 
up well when he concluded that: “Like Alice and the Red Queen, the developed region has to 
keep running to stay in the same place” (Krugman ,1979, p. 262).   
  A weakness of much of this work was that it was based on a very stylised 
representation of the global distribution of innovation, in which innovation was assumed to be 
concentrated in the developed world, mainly in the USA. However, as shown by Fagerberg 
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Verspagen in this volume.   13 
and Godinho in this volume, successful catch up in technology and income is normally not 
based only on imitation, but also involves innovation to a significant extent. Arguably, this is 
also what one should expect from the Schumpeterian perspective, in which innovation is 
assumed to be a pervasive phenomenon. Fagerberg (1987, 1988) identified three factors 
affecting “why growth-rates differ”; innovation, imitation and other efforts related to the 
commercial exploitation of technology, as driving forces of growth.  The inclusion of 
innovation in the explanatory framework, alongside the more conventional variables, 
significantly increased the model’s explanatory power. For instance, the analysis presented in 
Fagerberg (1988) suggested that superior innovative activity was the prime factor behind the 
huge difference in performance between Asian and Latin-American NIC-countries in the 
1970s and early 1980s. Fagerberg and Verspagen (2002) likewise found that the continuing 
rapid of the Asian NICs relative to other country groupings in the decade that followed was 
primarily caused by the rapid growth in the innovative performance of this region. Moreover, 
it has been shown (Fagerberg 1987, Fagerberg and Verspagen 2002) that while imitation has 
become more demanding over time (and hence more difficult and/or costly to undertake), 
innovation has gradually become a more powerful factor in explaining differences across 
countries in economic growth.  
  
What do we know about innovation? And what do we need to learn more about? 
 
Arguably, we have a good understanding of the role played by innovation in long run 
economic and social change, and many of its consequences:  
 
-  Innovation introduces novelty (variety) into the economic sphere. Should the stream of 
novelty (innovation) dry up, the economy will settle down in a “stationary state” with 
little or no growth (Metcalfe 1998). Hence, innovation is crucial for long-run 
economic growth. 
-  Innovation tends to cluster in certain industries/sectors, which consequently grow 
more rapidly, leading to structural changes in production and demand and, eventually, 
organisational and institutional change. The capacity to undertake the latter is 
important for the ability to benefit from innovation.  
-  Innovation is a powerful explanatory factor behind differences in performance 
between firms, regions and countries. Firms that succeed in innovation prosper, at the 
expense of their less able competitors. Innovative countries and regions have higher 
productivity and income than the less-innovative ones. Countries or regions that wish 
to catch-up with the innovation leaders face the challenge of increasing their own 
innovation activities towards leader-levels (see Godinho and Fagerberg in this 
volume).   
 
Because of these desirable consequences, policy-makers and business-leaders alike are 
concerned with how to foster innovation.  Nevertheless, in spite of the large amount of 
research in this area during the past fifty years, we know much less about why and how 
innovation occurs than what it leads to. Although it is by now well established that innovation 
is an organizational phenomenon, most theorizing about innovation has traditionally looked at 
it from an individualistic perspective, as exemplified by Schumpeter’s “psychological” theory 
of entrepreneurial behavior (Fagerberg 2003). Similarly, most work on cognition and 
knowledge focuses on individuals, not organizations. An important exception was, of course, 
Nelson and Winter (1982), whose focus on “organizational memory” and its links to practice   14 
paved the way for much subsequent work in this area.
21 But our understanding of how 
knowledge – and innovation – operates at the organizational level remains fragmentary and 
further conceptual and applied research is needed.  
A central finding in the innovation literature is that a firm does not innovate in 
isolation but depends on extensive interaction with its environment. Various concepts have 
been introduced to enhance our understanding of this phenomenon, most of them including 
the terms “system” or (somewhat less ambitious) “network”. Some of these, such as the 
concept of a “national system of innovation”, have become popular among policy-makers, 
who have been constrained in their ability to act by lack of a sufficiently developed 
framework for design and evaluation of policy. However, it is a long way from pointing to the 
systemic character of innovation processes (at different levels of analysis), to having an 
approach that is sufficiently developed to allow for systematic analysis and assessment of 
policy issues. Arguably, to be really helpful in that regard, these system approaches are in 
need of substantial elaboration and refinement (see the chapter by Edquist in this volume).   
   One problem making it difficult to improve our understanding is that innovation has 
been studied by different communities of researchers with different backgrounds. The failure 
of these communities to communicate more effectively with one another has impeded 
progress in this field. One consequence of these communication difficulties has been a certain 
degree of “fuzziness” with respect to basic concepts. This can only by improved by bringing 
these different communities together in a constructive dialogue. Different, and to some extent 
competing, perspectives should not always be seen as a problem, however. Many social 
phenomena are too complex to be analyzed properly from a single disciplinary perspective. 
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BOX 1. SPRU, FREEMAN AND THE SPREAD OF INNOVATION STUDIES  
 
SPRU – Science Policy Research Unit – at the University of Sussex, UK was founded in 1965 
with Christopher Freeman as its first director. From the beginning it had a cross-disciplinary 
research staff consisting of researchers with background from subjects as different as 
economics, sociology, psychology and engineering. SPRU developed its own cross-
disciplinary master and PhD programs and carried out externally funded research, much of 
which came to focus on the role of innovation in economic and social change.  It attracted a 
large number of young scholars from other countries who came to train and work here. 
The research initiated at SPRU led to a large number of projects, conferences and 
publications.  “Research Policy”, which came to be the central academic journal in the field, 
was established in 1972 with Freeman as the first editor (he was later succeeded by Keith 
Pavitt, also from SPRU).  Freeman’s influential book “The economics of industrial 
innovation” was published two years later, in 1974, and has since been revised twice. In 1982 
the book “Unemployment and Technical Innovation”, written by Freeman, Clark and Soete, 
appeared, introducing a system-approach to the role of innovation in long run economic and 
social change. Freeman later followed this up through an analysis of the national innovation 
system in Japan (Freeman 1987). He was also instrumental in setting up the large, 
collaborative IFIAS project which in 1988 resulted in the very influential book “Technical 
Change and Economic Theory”, edited by Dosi, Freeman, Nelson, Silverberg and Soete (both 
Dosi and Soete were SPRU PhD graduates).   
In many ways SPRU came to serve as a role model for the many centres/institutes that 
were established, mostly from the mid 1980s onwards, combining cross-disciplinary graduate 
and PhD teaching with extensive externally funded research. Most of these, as SPRU itself, 
were located to relatively newly formed (so-called “red-brick”) universities, which arguably 
showed a greater receptivity to new social needs, initiatives and ideas than the more inert, 
well established academic “leaders”, or at other types of institutions such as business or 
engineering schools. SPRU graduates were in many cases instrumental in spreading research 
and teaching on innovation to their own countries, particularly in Europe. 
    







BOX 2. THE INNOVATION THEORIST JOSEPH SCHUMPETER  
 
Joseph Schumpeter (1883-1950) is one of the most original social scientists of the 20
th 
century. He grew up in Vienna around the turn of the century and studied law and 
economics there. For most of his life he worked as an academic, but he also tried his luck 
as politician, serving briefly as finance minister in the first post-first-war (socialist) 
government, and as a banker (without much success). He became professor at the 
University of Bonn in 1925 and later at Harvard University in the USA (1932) where he 
stayed on until his death. He published several books and papers in German early on, 
among these the “Theory of Economic Development”, published in German in 1911 and, in 
a revised edition in English in 1934.  Among his most well known later works are 
“Business Cycles” in two volumes from 1939, “Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy” 
(1942) and the posthumously published “History of Economic Analysis” (1954). 
Very early he developed an original approach, focusing on the role of innovation in 
economic and social change. It was not sufficient, Schumpeter argued, to study the 
economy through static lenses, focusing on the distribution of given resources across 
different ends. Economic development, in his view, had to be seen as a process of 
qualitative change, driven by innovation, taking place in historical time. As examples of 
innovation he mentioned new products, new methods of production, new sources of supply, 
exploitation of new markets and new ways to organize business. He defined innovation as 
“new combinations” of existing resources.  This combinatory activity he labelled “the 
entrepreneurial function” (to be fulfilled by “entrepreneurs”) to which he attached a lot if 
importance. One main reason for this was the prevalence of inertia, or “resistance to new 
ways” as he phrased it, at all levels of society that entrepreneurs had to fight to succeed in 
their aims. In his early work, what is sometimes called “Schumpeter Mark I”, Schumpeter 
focused mostly at individual entrepreneurs. But in later works he also emphasized the 
importance of innovation in large firms (so-called “Schumpeter Mark II”), and pointed to 
historically oriented, qualitative research (case-studies) as the way forwards for research in 
this area.  
In his analysis of innovation-diffusion, Schumpeter emphasized the tendency for 
innovations to “cluster” in certain industries and time periods (and the derived effects on 
growth) and the possible contribution of such “clustering” to the formation of business 
cycles and “long waves” in the world economy (Schumpeter 1939). The latter suggestion 
has been a constant source of controversy ever since. Not less controversial, and perhaps 
even better known, is his inspired discussion of the institutional changes under capitalism 
(and its possible endogenous transformation into “socialism”) in the book “Capitalism, 
Socialism and Democracy (1943).    
 
Sources: Swedberg (1991), Shionoya (1997) and Fagerberg (2003)   19 
 
BOX 3 WHAT INNOVATION IS NOT: THE LINEAR MODEL  
  
Sometimes it easier to characterize a complex phenomenon by clearly pointing out what it 
is NOT.  Stephen Kline and Nathan Rosenberg did exactly this when they, in an influential 
paper from 1986, used the concept “the linear model” to characterize a widespread but in 
their erroneous view on innovation.  
 
Basically, “the linear model” is based on the assumption that innovation is applied science. 
It is “linear” because there is a well-defined set of stages that innovations are assumed to 
go through. Research (science) comes first, then development, and finally production and 
marketing. Since research comes first, it is easy to think of this of the critical element. 
Hence, this perspective is well suited to defend the interests of researchers and scientists 
and the organizations in which they work. 
 
The problems with this model, Kline and Rosenberg point out, are twofold. First, it 
generalizes a chain of causation that only holds for a minority of innovations. Although 
some important innovations stem from scientific breakthroughs, this is not true most of the 
time. Firms normally innovate because they believe there is a commercial need for it, and 
they commonly start by reviewing and combining existing knowledge.  It is only if this 
does not work, they argue, that firms consider investing in research (science). In fact, in 
many settings the experience of users, not science, is deemed to be the most important 
source of innovation (von Hippel 1988, Lundvall 1988).  Second, “the linear model” 
ignores the many feedbacks and loops that occur between the different “stages” of the 
process. Shortcoming and failures that occur at various stages may lead to reconsideration 
of earlier steps, and this may eventually lead to totally new innovations.  
   20 
 
    
BOX 4. WHAT IS HIGH-TECH? PAVITT’S  TAXONOMY 
  
The degree of technological sophistication, or innovativeness, of an industry or sector is 
something that attracts a lot of interest, and there have been several attempts to develop 
ways to classify industries or sectors according to such criteria. The most widely used in 
common parlance is probably the distinction between “high-tech”, “medium tech” and 
“low tech”, although it is not always clear exactly what is meant by this. Often it is equated 
high, medium and low R&D intensity in production (or value added), either directly (in the 
industry itself) or also including R&D embodied in machinery and other types of input. 
Based on this, industries such as aerospace, computers, semiconductors, 
telecommunications, pharmaceuticals and instruments are commonly classified as “high-
tech”, while “medium-tech” typically include electrical and non-electrical machinery, 
transport equipment and parts of the chemical industries. The remaining, “low-tech”, low 
R&D category, then, comprises industries such as textiles, clothing, leather products, 
furniture, metal products and so on (Fagerberg, 2002).  
 
However, while organized R&D activity is an important source of innovation in 
contemporary capitalism, it is not the only one. A sole focus on R&D might lead one to 
ignore or overlook innovation activities based on other sources, such as skilled personnel 
(engineers, for instance), learning by doing, using, interacting and so forth. This led Pavitt 
(1984) to develop a taxonomy or classification scheme which also took these other factors 
into account.  Based a very extensive data-set on innovation in the UK, he identified two   
(“high-tech”) sectors in the economy, both serving the rest of the economy with 
technology, but very different in terms of how innovations were created. One, which he 
labelled “science-based”, was characterized by a lot of organized R&D, and strong links to 
science,  while another – so-called “specialized suppliers” (of machinery, instruments and 
so on) – was based  on capabilities in engineering, and frequent interaction with users. He 
also identified a scale-intensive sector (transport equipment, for instance), it too relatively 
innovative, but with fewer repercussions for other sectors. Finally he found a number of 
industries that, although not necessarily non-innovative in every respect, received most of 
their technology from other sectors.  
 
An important result of Pavitt’s analysis was the finding that the factors leading to 
successful innovation differ a lot across industries/ sectors. This obviously called into 
question technology or innovation polices that only focused on one mechanism, such as, for 
instance, subsidies to R&D.   21 
 
BOX 5. INDUSTRIAL DYNAMICS – AN EVOLUTIONARY 
INTERPRETATION  
 
The book “An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change” (1982) by Richard Nelson and 
Sidney Winter is one of the most important contributions to the study of innovation and 
long run economic and social change. Nelson and Winter share the Schumpeterian focus on 
“capitalism as an engine of change”. However,  building on earlier work by Herbert Simon 
and others (so-called “procedural” or “bounded” rationality), Nelson and Winter introduce 
a more elaborate theoretical perspective on how firms behave. In Nelson and Winter’s 
models, firm’s actions are guided by routines, which are reproduced through practise, as 
parts of the firm’s “organizational memory”. Routines typically differ across firms. For 
instance, some firms may be more inclined towards innovation, while others may prefer the 
less demanding (but also less rewarding) imitative route. If a routine leads to an 
unsatisfactory outcome, a firm may use its resources search for a new one, which - if it 
satisfies the criteria set by the firm – will eventually be adopted (so-called “satisficing” 
behaviour).   
 
Hence, instead of following the common practice in much economic theorizing of  
extrapolating the characteristics of a “representative agent” to an entire population (so-
called “typological thinking”), Nelson and Winter look at the social and economic 
consequences of interaction within populations of heterogeneous actors (so-called 
“population thinking”). They also emphasize the role of chance (the stochastic element) in 
determining the outcome of the interaction. In the book these outcomes are explored 
through simulations, which allow the authors to study the consequences of varying the 
value of key parameters (to reflect different assumptions on technological progress, firm 
behaviour etc.). For instance, they distinguish between an “innovation regime”, in which 
the technological frontier is assumed to progress independently of firm’s own activities (the 
“science based” regime), and another in which technological progress is more endogenous 
and depends on what the firms themselves do (the “cumulative” regime).  They also vary 
the ease/difficulty of innovation and imitation.  
 
Nelson and Winter’s work has been an important source of inspiration for subsequent work 
on “knowledge-based firms”, “technological regimes” and “industrial dynamics”,  and 
evolutionary economics more generally, to mention some important topics.   
   22 
Figure 1."Innovation" in Title










1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
Social science, articles 1975- Social science, articles -1974
Humanities, articles 1975- Social sciences, all documents, 1975-




Note: The source is the ISI Web of Knowledge.  Both Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI) from 1956 to 
present and Arts & Humanities Citation Index (A&HCI) from 1975 to present were included. For each database, 
a search has been done, for the number of (i) articles and (ii) all documents (including articles) in English, and 
the total number of publications in each database, from the year 1975 to present. The results are presented as 
shares of total articles/documents. Before 1975, also non-English articles/documents were included in the 
calculations, so the numbers from that period are not strictly comparable to those for later years.   